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A LEGAL & PSYCHOLOGICAL
CRITIQUE OF THE PRESENT
APPROACH TO THE ASSESSMENT OF
THE COMPETENCE
OF CHILD WITNESSES'
BY NICHOLAS BALA, KANG LEE, ROD LINDSAY, & VICToRIA TALWAR*
The Canada Evidence Act requires an inquiry to
determine whether a child has the requisite moral and
intellectual capacity to testify. Caselaw suggests that a
child must demonstrate an understanding of abstract
concepts like "truth" and "promise" to be competent to
testify. This article reports on a survey of Ontario
justice system professionals, revealing significant
variation in how judges conduct competency inquiries.
Children are often asked about religious beliefs and
practices, and are frequently asked developmentally
inappropriate questions. The authors also report on
their experimental research which indicates that
children's ability to explain such abstract concepts as
"truth," "lie," and "promise" is not related to whether
children actually tell the truth. Child competency
inquiries are demeaning to children, do not promote
the search for the truth, and result in unnecessary
appeals. The child competence inquiry should be
abolished, though a judge should give a child simple
instructions about the importance of truth telling, and
ask the child to promise to tell the truth.
La loi sur la preuve au Canada requiert une enqu~te
afin de d6terminer si un enfant a la capacit6 morale et
intellectuelle exig6e pour pouvoir t6moigner. Afin
d'avoir la competence de t6moigner, la jurisprudence
sugg~re qu'un enfant dolt d6montrer qu'il ou elle
comprend certains concepts abstraits tel que "vrit6" et
"promesse." Cet article d6crit une 6tude faite parmi les
membres de la profession juridique en Ontario, et fait
voir des variations consid6rables dans la fagon dont les
juges font des enquates sur la capacit6 de rendre un
t~moignage. Les enfants sont souvent questionn~s sur
leurs pratiques et croyances religieuses et sont
fr6quemment demandds des questions qui ne
correspondent pas A leur niveau de d6veloppement. Les
auteurs d6crivent que lors de la recherche
exp6rimentale, il a 6t6 d6couvert que la capacit6 d'
enfant de pouvoir d6crire des concepts tels que
"v&it," "mensonge" et "promesse" n'est pas une
indication que ces enfants disent rdellement la v6rit6.
Les questions pos6es aux enfants pour 6valuer leur
comp6tence sont d6rogatoires, ne favorisent pas la
'appel h la v6rit6 et rdsultent , des appels inutiles. L'on
devrait abolir les enqu6tes sur Ia capacit6 de rendre
t6moignage et le juge devrait donner de simples
instructions au sujet de l'importance de dire la v6rit6 A
'enfant, et demander A I'enfant de promettre de dire la
v&it.
o 2001, N. Bala, K. Lee, R. Lindsay, and V. Talwar.
* This article is prepared as part of an interdisciplinary study of children as witnesses in the
criminal court process being undertaken by researchers at Queen's University. The authors wish to
acknowledge their collaboration with Janet Lee and Dr. John Leverette on this project, and the able
research assistance provided by Mandy Aylen, Jennifer Dysart, Marilyn Lindsay, and Erin
MeNamara. The authors also wish to thank the judges, Crown prosecutors, defence lawyers, and
victim witness workers who responded to their survey. Funding support for this research has been
provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The website for the
Child Witness Project at Queen's University is located online: Queen's University <http:I/
www.qsilver.queensu.ca/law/witness/witness.htm> (date accessed: 15 January 2001).
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I. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD WITNESSES
Child witnesses were traditionally viewed by legal systems as
unreliable-prone to lying and fantasizing, lacking the capacity to
correctly perceive or comprehend events, unable to accurately describe
their observations, and easily influenced.1 Late in the twentieth century,
legal systems in several jurisdictions began to appreciate the unique
needs and capacities of child witnesses, and to realize that these unique
qualities have often been misconstrued as unreliability. Nonetheless,
many jurisdictions continue to have legislation that requires some type
of special inquiry to assess the competence of children before they are
permitted to testify.
In Canada, section 16 of the Canada Evidence Act2 provides that
a child under fourteen years of age can only testify after a judicial
1 See, for example, N. Bala, "Double Victims: Child Sexual Abuse and the Canadian Criminal
Justice System" (1990) 15 Queen's L.J. 3 [hereinafter "Double Victims"].
2 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, as amended S.C. 1987, c. 24, s. 16 [hereinafter CEA].
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inquiry establishes that the child has the requisite moral and intellectual
capacity. This article considers the legal process for assessing child
witness competency. We begin with a discussion of the historical
evolution of the competency inquiry, and then compare the competency
inquiries conducted in Canada with those in the United States and
England.
This article reports on a survey, conducted by the authors, of
Ontario judges, lawyers, and victim witness workers concerning practices
and attitudes towards child witnesses. This survey reveals considerable
variation in attitudes and practices, but generally shows that emphasis is
placed on children demonstrating an understanding of concepts like
"oath," "truth" and, "promise." It is not uncommon in Canada for
judges to ask children questions about religious beliefs and practices.
While in the United States there is less emphasis placed on assessing
children's understanding of the oath, and less consideration of their
religious education, there are reported American cases of children as old
as eight years of age being ruled incompetent to testify because they
could not answer questions about "the difference between the truth and
a lie."3
Psychological research reveals that many children under age
seven (as well as some older children) often have a good understanding
of the difference between truth and lies, and yet are unable to
"correctly" answer abstract questions concerning these concepts. The
authors' recent laboratory research demonstrates that the ability of
children to answer abstract questions about truth telling is not related to
whether children actually tell the truth about their own wrongful acts. It
also shows that problems experienced during the questioning of children
at competence inquiries can often be attributed to developmentally
inappropriate questions.
This research indicates that the present legal approach to
assessing the competence of child witnesses does not promote the search
for the truth. It is demeaning to them and results in unnecessary appeals.
The authors recommend that Canada adopt the approach used in
England, where the competency inquiry has been abolished: judges
should give children simple instructions about the importance of truth
telling and ask them to promise to tell the truth.
3 Owens v. United States (1996), 668 A. 2d 399 at 404 (D.C. App.) [hereinafter Owens].
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II. THE HISTORY OF COMPETENCY INQUIRIES
Historically, the Canadian legal system was deeply suspicious of
child witnesses. Until recently, there were no provisions to facilitate the
testimony of children in the often hostile courtroom setting, and prior to
1893, the issue of competency of child witnesses was governed by the
common law of England.
By 1779, common law judges had established that "no testimony
whatever can be legally received except upon oath,"4 and that children
could be sworn provided that they appeared "to possess a sufficient
knowledge of the nature and consequences of an oath."S In making such
a determination, judges assessed whether children understood the
spiritual consequences of lying under oath. Children were required to
demonstrate not only knowledge of the concept of oath, but also a belief
in a Supreme Being who would punish false oaths. 6 The assumption was
that although children might understand the nature of an oath, they
could not appreciate its consequences without a belief in, and
understanding of, God.7 In R. v. Holmes, the judge was satisfied that a
child had the capacity to give sworn evidence when, after being asked
"what becomes of a person who tells lies [under oath]," the child
responded "if he tells lies he will go to the wicked fire." 8
In 1893, Canada enacted its first statutory provisions dealing with
child witnesses. Section 25 of the 1893 CEA9 allowed children of "tender
years" (i.e., under fourteen)10 who did not understand the nature of the
oath to give unsworn evidence, provided that they "possessed sufficient
intelligence" and understood "the duty to speak the truth."11 However,
this unsworn evidence was viewed with suspicion, and required
corroboration or independent supporting evidence.
By the middle of the twentieth century, religious expectations for
testimony under oath were relaxed. To be able to testify under oath,
4 R. v. Braisier (1979), 168 E.R. 202 [hereinafter Braisier].
5 Ibid.
6 R. v.Antrobus (1946), 63 B.C.R. 372 at 374 (C.A.) [hereinafter Antrobus].
71bid. at 378.
8 (1861), 175 E.R. 1286 at 1286 (Winter Assizes).
9 This provision (now s. 16 of the CEA) remained in force until 1988: see CEA, supra note 2.
10 See Antrobus, supra note 6; R. v. Bannerman (1966), 55 W.W.R. 257 (Man. C.A.)
[hereinafter Bannerman], aff'd without reasons (1966) 57 W.W.R. 736. (S.C.C.).
11 "Tender years" was in the CEA, S.C. 1893, c. 31, s. 25.
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children did not need to state that they believed in divine sanctions for
failing to tell the truth, provided they demonstrated an understanding
that they were calling on God to witness their evidence, and that the
oath was a promise to God to speak the truth.12 By the latter part of the
twentieth century, in leading cases judges moved away from inquiring
into a child's religious beliefs.
III. THE PRESENT SECTION 16 INQUIRY IN CANADA:
PRECEDENTS & PRACTICES
On 1 January 1988, amendments to the CEA came into force
providing:
16(1) Where a proposed witness is a person under fourteen years of age or a person
whose mental capacity is challenged, the court shall, before permitting the person to give
evidence, conduct an inquiry to determine
(a) whether the person understands the nature of an oath or a solemn affirmation; and
(b) whether the person is able to communicate the evidence.
(2) A person ... who understands the nature of an oath or a solemn affirmation and is
able to communicate the evidence shall testify under oath or solemn affirmation.
(3) A person ... who does not understand the nature of an oath or a solemn affirmation
but is able to communicate the evidence may testify on promising to tell the truth.
(4) A person ... who neither understands the nature of an oath or a solemn affirmation
nor is able to communicate the evidence shall not testify.
13
The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether children
understand the moral obligation of making an oath or solemn
affirmation, and are able to communicate the evidence in court. If a
child cannot swear an oath, then the judge must assess whether the child
is capable of testifying on a promise to tell the truth. 14
12 The decisions in Bannerman, supra note 10, and R. v. Budin (1981) 32 O.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.)
[hereinafter Budin], were extremely influential in lowering the religious expectations on child
witnesses, and continue to be cited by the courts today.
13 Supra, note 2. This was part of a package of reforms intended to facilitate children's
testimony, for example, allowing children to testify from behind a screen or by closed circuit
television. See also "Double Victims," supra note 1 and R. Bessner, "The Competency of the Child
Witness: A Critical Analysis of Bill C-15" (1989) 31 Crim. L.Q. 481.
14 A child's out-of-court statement may be admitted even if the child is not competent to
testify. The Supreme Court of Canada, in R v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 [hereinafter Khan],
created a generalized exception to the hearsay rule, allowing for the reception of hearsay statements
if they are considered "necessary" and "reliable."
See also B.P. Archibald, "The Canadian Hearsay Revolution: Is Half a Loaf Better Than No
Loaf At All" (1999) 25 Queen's L.J. 1; D.M. Paciocco, "The Evidence of Children: Testing the
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In an effort to understand the way the present section 16 inquiry
is conducted, the authors conducted a written survey of professionals
who work with child witnesses in the criminal courts in Ontario. The
respondents were 20 child-victim workers, 44 Crown prosecutors, 194
defence counsel, and 91 provincially appointed judges.1S The survey
covered all aspects of the section 16 inquiry: preparation of child
witnesses; the extent to which children are asked questions about the
nature of an oath; their ability to communicate; and their understanding
of the difference between truth and lies and what a promise means.16
Some of the key findings of this survey are included in this article.
Section 16 presumes that children over the age of fourteen are
competent to testify. 17 The relevant age for the inquiry is the age at the
time that he or she is testifying, rather than at the time of the events in
issue.18 Judges and Crown counsel reported that the youngest children
appearing in court were about four years old.
While the Ontario Court of Appeal held in R. v. IKackl9 that a
judge is obliged to hold an inquiry under section 16 for every child under
fourteen, and the failure to conduct such an inquiry amounts to a
procedural error. This error can be remedied by applying the curative
provision in section 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code,20 provided the
accused's right to a fair trial has not been prejudiced. 21 In cases where
defence counsel concedes that a child witness called by the Crown has
Rules Against What We Know" (1996) 21 Queen's L.J. 345.
15 The survey was conducted in Ontario in the summer of 1999. Approximately 725 surveys
were sent out to defence counsel, 250 to judges, and 25 to victim witness workers. Surveys were
distributed to Crown prosecutors at their summer education programs; the number distributed is
not known: The full results are available online: Queen's University,
<http:llwww.qsilver.queensu.callawlwitnesslwitness.htm> (date accessed: 28 February 2001).
16 The survey also asked respondents questions about other issues related to the examination
and cross-examination of children, including questions about use of videotapes and closed circuit
television.
17 CEA, supra note 2, s. 16(5). Note, however, that the competence of all witnesses may be
challenged if they suffer from a mental disability. See, for example, R. v. Parrott, [2001] S.C.J. No. 4,
for a decision dealing with a competency inquiry for a twenty-five-year-old complainant with the
mental age of a three- or four-year-old child.
18 R. v. Donovan (1991), 65 C.C.C. (3d) 511 (Ont. C.A.) at 518.
19 (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 480 [hereinafter Krack].
20 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
21 This position has been approved by the Quebec and Ontario Courts of Appeal: see R. v.
Deyardin, [1997] R.J.Q. 2367; Krack, supra note 19 at 485. However, in some cases the failure to
conduct an inquiry has been a ground for ordering a new trial: see R. v. D.(R.R.) (1989), 72 Sask. R.
142 (C.A.) [hereinafter D. (R.R.)]; R. v. G. (C.W.) (1994), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 240 (B.C.C.A.).
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the requisite competency, the court is not required to conduct an
inquiry.22
The competency inquiry requires a finding, based on a balance of
probabilities, that the child is competent to testify.23 In Canada, this type
of voir dire24 is usually conducted in the presence of the jury, as the
inquiry may help the jury assess the child's credibility.25
According to section 16(1), "the court" shall conduct the
competency inquiry. Traditionally, the trial judge led the questioning,
with counsel given the opportunity to ask supplemental questions.26
However, there is a growing recognition by judges that the Crown
prosecutor (usually the counsel calling a child witness to the stand to
testify) may be the most suitable person to question the child, given the
child's familiarity with the Crown and the child's lack of prior contact
with the judge.27 In R. v. R. G.F., the Alberta Court of Appeal held that
under section 16(1), a trial judge is not obliged to conduct the inquiry,
but merely to control it.28
The survey results indicate that in Ontario, judges take the lead
in questioning in about three-quarters of the competency inquiries,
leaving the Crown to take the lead in the other cases. Some judges are
substantially more willing to allow the Crown to take on this role than
other judges,29 and responses revealed a range of opinions among judges
2 2 R. v. Fong (1994), 157 A.R. 73 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1994] S.C.C.A. No.
523.
2 3 R. v. Ferguson, [1996] B.C.J. No. 2617 [hereinafter Ferguson].
24 A voir dire is a hearing within a trial to determine the admissibility of a particular piece of
evidence. For most types of issues of admissibility, this hearing is conducted in the absence of the
jury.
2 5 R.E. Salhany, The Practical Guide to Evidence in Criminal Cases, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1996) at 24. This line of reasoning was adopted in Ferguson, supra note 23 at para. 33, where the
British Columbia Court of Appeal stated that "the questions of competence-to be determined by
the judge-and of credibility-to be determined by the jury-are tightly entwined." The court
indicated that although it is preferable for the jury to be present during the competency inquiry, its
absence is not a reversible error.
26 D. Paciocco & L. Stuesser, The Law of Evidence (Concord: Irwin Law, 1996). Cases in
which this procedure was followed include: D.(R.R.), supra note 21 and R. v. Leonard (1990), 37
O.A.C. 269 (C.A.) [hereinafter Leonard].
2 7 R. v. Peterson (1996), 27 O.R. (3d) 739 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [19961
S.C.C.A. no. 202. See also Ferguson, supra note 23.
28 [1997] A.J. No. 409 at 282-83 (C.A.).
29 Crown prosecutors said the judge leads the inquiry 75 per cent of the time; victim witness
workers said the judge leads 80 per cent of the time. Judges said they lead the inquiry 82 per cent of
the time.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
as to who should lead the inquiry. Some judges took a traditional
approach: "All questions must be put by the judge," while others let
their own experiences influence the way the inquiry is conducted in their
courts: "Up to about ten years ago I did it all. In the last ten years I have
allowed counsel who usually have had the benefit of going over the
matter with the child allowing for a less stressful experience for the
proposed witness."30
A. Sworn Testimony
In determining whether children possess the legal capacity to
give sworn testimony, judges are obliged to assess whether they
understand the nature of an oath (or solemn affirmation).31 The focus of
this inquiry is on whether children understand the moral significance of
making a commitment to tell the truth, and appreciate the importance of
telling the truth in court proceedings. A frequently cited formulation of
the standard was enunciated by Mr. Justice Dickson, sitting ad hoc on
the Manitoba Court of Appeal, in 1966 in Bannerman: "The object of
the law in requiring an oath is to get at the truth relative to the matters
in dispute by getting a hold on the conscience of the witness." 32
In 1982, Assistant Chief Justice MacKinnon, on behalf of the
Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Fletcher, provided this gloss on the
standard:
The important consideration, we think, when a judge has to decide whether a child
should properly be sworn, is whether the child has sufficient appreciation of the solemnity
of the occasion, and the added responsibility to tell the truth, which is involved in taking
an oath, over and above the duty to tell the truth which is an ordinary duty of normal
social conduct 33
A significant area of judicial disagreement is the appropriateness
of questions regarding children's religious education and beliefs. The
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Fletcher clearly suggests that
30 Judges Survey (on file with authors at Queen's University, Kinston, Ontario) at question 4
[hereinafter "Judges' Survey"].
31 In theory, those without religious beliefs relating to an oath or who choose not to testify
under oath may solemnly affirm, which has the same legal effect as testimony under oath.
Interestingly, it seems that judges rarely, if ever, ask children to affirm, and there appear to be no
reported Canadian cases in which children have been asked questions about solemn affirmations.
3 2 Supra note 10 at 284.
33 (1982), 1 C.C.C. (3d) 370 at 380, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1983), 48 N.R. 319
[hereinafter Fletcher].
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children are no longer required to demonstrate an awareness of God in
order to be able to provide sworn testimony to the court. The court
recognized that a decline in religious observance and changes in
religious beliefs have given the oath a different significance for many
Canadians than it may have had in the past.3 4 The court stated:
It is recognized that as society has changed over the years the oath for many has lost its
spiritual and religious significance. Those adults to whom the sanctity of the oath has lost
its religious meaning, nonetheless have a sense of moral obligation to tell the truth on
taking the oath and feel their conscience bound by it. That is the nature of the oath for
many adult witnesses today. Nor do they object on grounds of conscientious scruples to
taking the oath. In my view, a child of tender years is in the same position as an adult
witness when the determination is being made whether the child understands the nature
of an oath.35
In a 1999 judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada, Madame Justice
McLachlin commented on the "absurdity of subjecting children to
examination on whether they understood the religious consequences of
the oath."36
Despite these judicial pronouncements, it is still a common
practice for judges or counsel to ask children questions regarding their
religious education and beliefs to determine their moral capacity to
testify under oath. This approach is presumably based on the assumption
that children with religious training are less likely to lie, or, that only if
they demonstrate a belief in God will their oath have a significant impact
on the truthfulness of their testimony.
Eighty-six per cent of judges responding to the survey reported
that children are still routinely asked questions relating to religious
beliefs and observances as part of the competency inquiry. Crown
prosecutors also reported that children are asked, during both
preparation and the inquiry, such questions as: "Do you go to Sunday
School?" "Is the Bible a special book?" "Is a promise made while
holding the Bible different from other promises?" and "Do you
understand the importance of God and why it is important not to lie to
God?" Children are also asked if they have an understanding of the
spiritual consequences of lying under oath, such as: "If you lied to God,
would you go to heaven or hell?"
34 The Canadian courts have long accepted that witnesses who are not Christians may give an
oath on the holy book or a holy symbol of their faith. See, for example, R v. Lai Ping (1904), 11
B.C.R. 102 (C.A.).
3 5 Fletcher, supra note 33 at 377.
36 R. v. F. (WJ.) [W.J.F.], [1999] 3 S.C.R. 569 at 591 [hereinafter F. (W.J.)].
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It appears most judges still construe the word "oath" strictly in
the section 16 inquiry, focusing on the child's ability to understand or
make a "solemn appeal to God (or to something sacred) in witness that a
statement is true."37 Judges ask children questions "about the Bible,
church, who God is, and whether God cares if we're good or bad and if
we tell the truth; and ... if the child knows what God would do if a sworn
witness lies." 38 A victim witness worker said one child had been asked to
explain the nature of "God" to the judge. One judge explained:
I ... build through attendance at church and religious education to see if [the] child
understood [the] oath in that context-then move on to the oath as a special promise. In
my experience, if there is no religious background training younger children (i.e., under
twelve) will not understand an oath.39
It would appear that children are typically asked questions which
presume that they are Christians, such as: "Do you go to church?" and
"Do you go to Sunday school?" Some judges (often those in larger, more
cosmopolitan urban centres) ask questions about religious beliefs in a
more ecumenical fashion, recognizing that the children can have a range
of religious backgrounds. One judge expressed it this way: "This can be a
very sensitive area to explore in a multicultural environment where
'God' may mean many Gods and religious concepts may vary
significantly from Judeo-Christian concepts." 40
A typical example of an inquiry into religious beliefs and practice
is found in the transcript of a 1994 Ontario case, where the judge asked a
six year-old boy the following questions:
Q: ... Just to change the topic for a moment because I have been ... you certainly
have a very interesting and active life and I am learning a little bit about it but
just to change the topic, do you know what an oath is? You do not eh? Okay,
and do you go to church?
A: No.
Q: Do you go to Sunday School?
A: No. Stewart.
Q: No. Do you take any classes in school?
A: Yeah, I am in Grade Two and One.
Q: You are both in Two and ... both in Grade Two and Grade One?
37 This definition is from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. "oath", approved
by Mr. Justice Jessup in Budin, supra note 12 (Mr. Justice Arnup concurring).
38 "Judges Survey," supra note 30 at question 23.
3 9 Ibid
40 Ibid. at question 24.
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A: Yeah.
Q: Do you take any classes, or does the teacher at school ever tell you about God
and that kind of thing?
A: No.
0: There is no religious training of any kind?
A: No.4 1
This child was not permitted to testify under oath, although he was
permitted to give unsworn testimony.
The age and cognitive development of child witnesses usually
determines the extent and nature of the inquiry. For younger children,
the inquiry is usually lengthier, with questions broken down into age-
appropriate language and format. For older children, due to their
advanced language and cognitive development, this type of inquiry is
usually quite brief. For children between the ages of ten and thirteen,
questions regarding their ability to understand the nature of an oath
often take the following form:
Q: Now have you seen people take the Bible in their hand and swear to tell the
truth?
A: Yeah.
Q" Now, if we were to have you swear on the Bible to tell the truth and then you
lied, what do you think would happen to you?
A: I would get into a lot of trouble.
4 2
There is disagreement evident both in the case law and in the
survey about the extent to which children should be prepared for the
competency inquiry, in particular as it relates to the oath. Children are
usually prepared by the Crown prosecutor or a victim witness worker so
that, at a minimum, the child knows what to expect from the court
appearance.43 This preparation will usually include a review of the
competency inquiry. Child victim witness workers reported that they
usually address the religious aspects of the oath in preparing children for
41 R. v. Easton (May 1994), Perth Cty. 18949 (Gen. Div.); see also, for example, R. v. R. (ME.)
(1989), 90 N.S.R. (2d) 439 at 43-44 (C.A.) [hereinafter (R.)M.E.].
42 These questions were taken from the competency inquiry of a 13 year-old girl in R. v.
Thomson in the Ontario Court (Provincial Division) in Orillia on 15 August 1995 before Judge L. T.
Montgomery (unreported). For another example of questioning of older children, see (R.)M.E.,
ibid.
43 In the authors' survey, 100 per cent of victim witness workers and 79 per cent of Crown
prosecutors reported that, before the child appeared in court, they instructed the child about the
oath or the promise to tell the truth.
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court. They explain what an oath means (promise to God), how it is
done (hand on the Bible), and discuss what the children believe will
happen to them if they lie in a social situation as opposed to in court.
One victim witness worker said:
[I] aiways inquire about the child's understanding of the oath and making a promise. If a
child can communicate a reasonable explanation, I will then confirm their understanding.
If the child has difficulty explaining or understanding, I will explain the oath and discuss
the importance of keeping promises in court and telling the truth. [I] will ask [the] child
to come up with potential consequences of not telling the truth under oath or promise.
4 4
In Bannerman, Mr. Justice Dickson said it was not only
appropriate for children to be prepared in such a way, but that counsel
calling a child had a duty to the child to do so:
A child to whom every aspect of the matter is new will almost surely give the honest but
wrong answer to: "Do you know what it means to take an oath?" Why should he, if he has
never heard of it? Those calling a child have a duty to inform and instruct, and, failing the
performance of their duty, the court should do it. A child who does niot know what an
oath is may at once understand the import of the simple words of the common oath if
someone has the kindness to let the child know what they are before starting an inquiry
into his theological opinions. 45
As well, Mr. Justice Dickson supported the use of leading
questions at the competency inquiry to bring out children's
understanding. He cited Wigmore to support the view that a judge may
properly impart any necessary theological or other instruction to
children to "produce the necessary belief" to qualify them to testify
under oath.46 Mr. Justice Dickson also took issue with what he perceived
to be a consistent "error" in Canadian courts that followed the
Antrobus47 decision in demanding that children demonstrate an
understanding of the "consequences" of a lie under oath, meaning,
"spiritual retribution."48 He found such questions were unfair as they
demanded a pat, yet perhaps untruthful, response, for "what are the
44 Victim Witness Survey (on file with authors at Queens' University, Kingston, Ontario) at
question 6 [hereinafter "Victim Survey"].
45 Supra note 10 at 283. In R. v. M.A.M., [2001] B.C.J. 18 (C.A.), (leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada filed 16 February 2001) [hereinafter M.A.M.] the court accepted that the
mother of a five-year-old child could instruct the child about the meaning of a "promise" before the
child testified, though the majority held that her testimony about the child's apparent
comprehension could not be used to establish the child's competence.
46 Bannerman, ibid.
47 Supra note 6.
48 Bannerman, supra note 10 at 283.
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spiritual consequences of telling a lie under oath? No human being can
say."4 9
A clear majority of judges (89 per cent) in our survey indicated
that they approved of counsel, a parent, or a victim witness worker
preparing child witnesses to testify by telling them about the oath.
However, despite the clear endorsement in Bannerman, and the
widespread use of this practice, some participants in the justice system
are uncomfortable with such preparation and believe this process simply
teaches children the answers necessary to testify.
Eleven per cent of judges disagreed with preparing child
witnesses by explaining the nature of an oath. These judges expressed
concern that the Crown, parents, social workers or victim witness
workers' preparation taints the section 16 inquiry as the court simply
hears prepared responses. This view is supported by 50 per cent of
defence counsel who do not think the current section 16 inquiry is an
appropriate assessment of child witnesses. Pre-trial preparation or
coaching was of great concern to them, and some went so far as to ask
for full disclosure of the course of preparation children went through.
They thought, generally, that the standard might be too low to qualify
children, and that judges "bend over backwards"50 to permit children to
testify. One defence counsel said that by the time child witnesses come
to court they are well aware of "what to answer and how."51 Defence
counsel advocate greater restrictions on child witnesses, some stating
"no child under ten ought ever to be sworn"52 and others suggesting that
no one under thirteen years should be sworn.53
One of the problems with the current inquiry, said defence
counsel, is that the court spends too much time on the oath and not
enough on children's "ability to observe, their capacity to recollect and
their capacity to communicate that recollection."5 4 Some defence
counsel felt the theological basis for the oath is incomprehensible to
many young children, making it inappropriate for them to swear an
oath.S5
4 9 Ibid. at 282.
50 "Judges Survey," supra note 30 at question 2.
51 Defence Counsel Survey (archived with authors at Queens' University, Kingston, Ontario)
at question 9 [hereinafter "Defence Survey"].
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid at question 3.
55 Ibid. at question 6.
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It is apparent that children often find the inquiry into their
religious beliefs embarrassing, especially if it looks like they do not
appear sufficiently devout or knowledgeable about religious matters.
Members of each group surveyed-judges, victim witness workers,
Crown, and defence-expressed some degree of discomfort with this
aspect of the inquiry.
One victim witness worker reported how a defence counsel in
one case "humiliated" a child about her family's beliefs. When the child
wasn't able to articulate the precise tenets of her family's faith, defence
counsel misconstrued her statements, mocked her, and suggested she
had no reason to tell the truth because she believed the world would end
soon anyway.
Some judges find religious questions embarrassing at times, and
try to avoid any specific denominational or sectarian discussions in the
inquiry. Others believe that any questions relating to religious beliefs are
inappropriate in court.
The precedents provide trial judges with little guidance in
assessing how in-depth the inquiry must be to satisfy the standard for
testifying under oath. As one judge acknowledged: "I find this the
hardest part of the inquiry-reducing to understandable language the
nature and consequences of the oath."56
B. Unsworn Testimony: The Promise to Tell the Truth
Subsection 16(3) of the CEA permits children who are unable to
demonstrate an understanding of the nature of an oath or solemn
affirmation to testify "on promising to tell the truth."S7
In interpreting this provision, Canadian judges have generally
held that children should only be permitted to give unsworn testimony if
the court is satisfied that the the promise is meaningful, and hence there
must be an inquiry into their understanding of the nature of a promise
and of the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie.58 The
courts have held that this requires children to demonstrate some
understanding of the duty to speak the truth.5 9 In R. v. McGovern, Mr.
Justice Twaddle of the Manitoba Court of Appeal said:
5 61b at question 7.
5 7 Supra note 2.
58 R. v. Farley (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 445 at 453 (C.A.) [hereinafter Farley].
5 9Ibia.
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It is equally clear, in my view, that, in permitting a witness to give evidence "on promising
to tell the truth", the statute implicitly requires an understanding on the witness's part of
what a promise is and the importance of keeping it. Otherwise, the promise would be an
empty gesture.60
In Ferguson,61 the court conducted a competency inquiry for a
five year-old girl, focusing on whether the child demonstrated an
understanding of the significance of a promise. Questions were posed by
the judge, Crown counsel, and the defence counsel. The child, K., could
not say where she lived, the name of her school, or her teacher's name.
She was able to identify the colour of some books and responded
appropriately when challenged to identify truths or lies told about the
colours of those books. On the strength of her demonstrated knowledge
and ability to differentiate between truth and lies, the Crown wanted her
to testify on a promise to tell the truth. Part of the transcript reads:
Q [Judge]:Do you know what a promise is?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you tell me if you've ever promised something and then done it?
A: I promised that I wouldn't lie.
Q: Anything else around your house? Did you ever promise your mom




Q: Do you know what a promise is?
60 (1993), 88 Man. R. (2d) 18 (C.A.) at 21 [hereinafter McGovem].
61 Supra note 23. In M.A.M., supra note 45, the B.C. Court of Appeal (Justices Rowles and
Newbury concurring) ordered a new trial after the trial judge convicted the accused based largely on
the testimony of a five-year-old, ruling that she should not have been permitted to testify. The girl
had demonstrated an understanding of the difference between the truth and a lie. What was at issue
was the percieved inadequacy of her answer to abstract question like: "What is a promise?" Her
response was "What you say when you have to do it," and was considered inadequate to
demonstrate that she understood "the moral obligation or duty to speak the truth." It is submitted
that the approach of Justice Hall (dissenting) was preferable, and more consistent with the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Rockey, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 829 [hereinafter Rockey]. Justice Hall observed
that appeal courts should be reluctant to overrule a judge's decision on a determination of a child's
competence, as well as recognizing a child's understanding and answers to questions in a
competency inquiry will inevitably be "simple" and "concrete." As discussed more fully below, a
child's ability to provide an answer to abstract questions about the meaning of a "lie" and a
"promise" is unrelated to whether a child will actually tell the truth.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 38 NO. 3
A: Yeah.
Q: What is it?
A: I promise that I won't lie.
Q: But it's about something else other than lying. Do you know what,
when you say promise, what you mean?
A: I promise what I mean.
Q: What do you think would happen ... if you told us about something and what
you told us wasn't right, what would happen to you?
A: I don't know.
Q: Do you think it would matter?
A: No.
Q: It wouldn't matter if you didn't tell the truth? Nobody would say
you've done the wrong thing?
A: No.
62
The judge said he was uncertain as to whether the child fully
understood the nature of a promise and held she was not competent to
testify. A second voir dire into the admissibility of her hearsay statements
to her mother and a police officer was conducted. Afterward, the judge












Should I ask her to promise to tell the truth?
I think you should.
[K.], do you promise to tell the court the truth?
Yeah.
Good girl.
And when you say that do you know what that means, promise?
No.
Are you going to tell any lies?
No.
And you know that when you're in here that you must tell the truth?
Yeah.
62 Ferguson, ibiL at 38-39.
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The accused was convicted and launched an appeal in part on
the grounds that the child did not understand what a promise was and,
therefore, could not testify under section 16(3). The British Columbia
Court of Appeal stated that section 16 requires not only an
understanding of the difference between truth and lies, but an
understanding of the nature of a promise. Specifically, the "requirement
to promise to tell the truth is essential to the admission of testimony
under section 16(3)."64 The failure to establish that a child understands
the nature of a promise was held to be a fundamental and not just a
procedural error. In allowing the appeal and ordering a new trial, Mr.
Justice Finch stated:
There was no evidence either from K.T. or from other witnesses on the voir dire that K.T.
knew she had a duty to tell the truth in everyday social conduct. Her promise to do so,
given in response to a leading question, was meaningless. The evidence does not support
the conclusion that she knew what she was doing when she gave her promise.6 5
The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court must be satisfied not only
that the witness can communicate the evidence, but that the child
understands what a promise is.
While it is not uncommon for children to be asked to define
"promise" in order to be able to testify based on a promise to tell the
truth, leading Supreme Court of Canada precedents suggest that it is not
necessary for a child to actually be able to do so. Madame Justice
McLachlin, writing for a majority in Rockey, stated:
Two requirements must be met to establish testimonial competence under s. 16(3): the
ability to communicate the evidence and the ability to promise to tell the truth ... it is not
necessary that the witness be able to define the word "promise" in some technical sense;
what is required is that the witness understand the obligation to tell the truth in giving his
or her evidence. 6 6
The pre-1988 legislation explicitly required a judge admitting
unsworn evidence to be satisfied that the child "understands the duty to
63 Ibid at 41.
64 Ibid at 49.
6 5 Ibid. at 50 [emphasis added].
6 6 Supra note 61.
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speak the truth."67 In interpreting this older statute, Mr. Justice Robins
in R. v. Khan remarked:
To satisfy the less stringent standards applicable to unswom evidence, the child need only
understand the duty to speak the truth in terms of ordinary everyday social conduct. This
can be demonstrated through a simple line of questioning related to whether the child
understands the difference between the truth and a lie, knows that it is wrong to lie,
understands the necessity to tell the truth, and promises to do so. 68
The present provision does not explicitly require judges to be
satisfied that children understand the duty to speak the truth. However,
many judges continue to inquire into whether children understand the
difference between the truth and a lie as an aspect of ensuring that the
"promise to tell the truth" is meaningful, 69 and the approach of Mr.
Justice Robins in Khan is still frequently cited.70 An example of this type
of questioning can be found in the competency inquiry transcript for a
six-year-old boy in the 1994 Ontario case of R. v. Easton:
Q: Okay. Can you tell me whether you know the difference between the truth and
a lie?
A: The truth, you tell somebody what the matter and a lie is you don't tell nobody,
so it is not a lie.
Q: Yes. If I were to tell you that it was snowing outside right now, would that be a
lie?
A: Yeah.
Q: Okay. If I were to tell you that it is raining outside now, would that be a lie?
A: No.




Q: It would be right, the truth, eh? So for you what is right is the truth?
67 CEA, supra note 2.
68 Khan, supra note 14, quoted with approval by Madame Justice McLachlin at 7.
69 Ferguson, supra note 23 at 50.
70 Farley, supra note 58 at 451, where the Ontario Court of Appeal applied the standard
enunciated in Khan in 1988 to the presents. 16(3).
71 As in this case, it is common for the child and questioner to confuse a lie (a deliberate
falsehood with the intent to deceive) with an error (which is not intentional).
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A: Yeah.
Q: And you ... do you understand that it is wrong to tell a lie?
A: A lie.
Q: Why is it wrong to tell a lie?
A: Because everybody want to know, or maybe.
Q: Everybody wants to know what? The truth?
A: Yeah, the truth.
Q: They want to know whether it is the truth or a lie?
A: Or a lie.
Q: Yeah. What happens if you tell a lie?
A: You tell a lie and then you ... everybody wants ... to know, because you asked
what is the matter and then they say they tell a lie.
0: Oh, do you think it is wrong to tell a lie?
A: Yeah, it is wrong.
Q: Okay. Do you think you should get in trouble if you tell a lie?
Q: Well if you were allowed to tell something today, would you promise me to tell
the truth?
A: Yes.
Q: And only the truth?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you promise me that you would not lie?
A: I would not lie. 72
This child was allowed to testify on a promise to tell the truth, as
the judge was satisfied that he was able to communicate whatever
evidence he had and that he understood what was entailed in promising
to tell the truth. 73
7 2 Easton, supra note 41 at 415-17. See also Leonard, supra note 26.
73 There are appeal cases dealing with the problem that can arise if there is an inquiry into the
child's understanding of the duty to speak the truth but fails to ask the child to explicitly promise to
tell the truth. This type of oversight can occur since during the detailed competency inquiry the
child will have already answered many questions about the importance of speaking the truth. A
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The inquiry for giving unsworn testimony, especially for younger
children, is often much longer than for childrbn who demonstrate
understanding of an oath. As the examples above illustrate, the
questions tend to be longer than the answers. These brief and basic
answers are not surprising, as children are likely to be nervous in the
intimidating court environment and because they lack the cognitive
capacity to give long answers about abstract issues.74
Thirty-eight per cent of judges who responded to the survey said
that in determining whether a child can give unsworn testimony, they
often asked children if it was good or bad to tell a lie; 51 per cent often
asked children whether they know it is very important to tell the truth in
court; and 46 per cent always asked if children knew the
consequences-to them-of telling a lie in court. Some judges also said
that they tried to explain to children why it is important for them to tell
the truth in court (e.g., so the judge can "do my job and make
decisions" 75 or to give them "an understanding of my reliance on their
promise to tell the truth" 76).
Thirty-four per cent of judges reported that they sometimes ask
children to define a promise, while another 34 per cent said they often
do so. Thirty-five per cent of judges said that six was the youngest age at
which children could articulate the meaning of a promise. To ascertain
whether they have such an understanding, judges ask a variety of
questions to learn what types of promises children have made (e.g., to
clean their room, eat their vegetables, brush their teeth or do their
homework), and then explore the consequences that flow from breaking
or keeping the promise.
Section 16 does not specifically provide a step-by-step test for
assessing children's ability to testify. Nor does the section attach any
distinction in terms of the weight to be attributed to evidence given
under oath or on a promise to tell the truth. As such, it has been left to
the courts to interpret this section, resulting in varying approaches.
In R. v. Marquard,77 Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
(dissenting) said that the test for admitting children's testimony should
number of decisions have held that this is a procedural error to fail to have an explicit promise, but
it may not be grounds for ordering a new trial since the questioning raises a commitment to tell the
truth: seeR. v. Barosoum, [1991] N.W.T.J. No. 171 (C.A.); and R. v. Peterson, [1996] O.R. (3d) 739
(C.A.).
74 See N. Bala, K. Lee, &J.P. Schuman, "Developmentally Appropriate Questions for Child
Witnesses" (1999) 25 Queen's LJ. 251 [hereinafter "Appropriate Questions"].
75 "Judges Survey," supra note 30 at question 28.
76 1bid.
77 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223 [hereinafter Marquard].
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be conducted in keeping with Parliament's intention in drafting the new
section 16-that is, to make it easier for children to testify. To do
otherwise would "subvert the purpose of legislative reform in this
area."78 She concluded:
one of the main aims of the reform was to simplify the requirements for the reception of
such evidence to facilitate its admissibility. ... [The Badgeley Committee] was set up
specifically to examine the substantive and adjectival law affecting the prosecution of
sexual offenses against children ..... On the basis of research which made clear that
conventional assumptions about the veracity and powers of articulation and recall of
young children are largely unfounded, the Committee recommended that children's
evidence be heard and weighed in the same manner as any other testimony. 79
Judicial interpretations of the weight of sworn and unsworn
evidence have varied. The Manitoba Court of Appeal in McGovern held
that "the weight which should be given to a young witness's evidence is
not affected by the form of the witness's commitment to tell the truth."so
Yet, in speaking for the majority in Marquard, Madame Justice
McLachlin approved of the trial judge's treatment of the child's unsworn
evidence in her charge to the jury. The trial judge warned the jury
repeatedly that the child had not been sworn and "to convict on the
unconfirmed and unsworn evidence of a child witness is fraught with
dangers ... ."81 Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to support
the view that the unsworn testimony of a child should be given less
weight than sworn testimony.
Defence counsel who responded to the survey were evenly split
on whether the current section 16 inquiry was appropriate, and they
expressed a variety of opinions on the value of a child's unsworn
testimony. One remarked:
All child witnesses end up being able to testify on a promise to tell the truth even when
it's very questionable whether they know what promise or truth actually mean. That's very
dangerous!
78 Ibid. at 256.
79 Ibid. at 257-58.
80 Supra note 60 at 23. The court agreed with the following passage from D. (R.R.), supra note
21 at 147:
The purposes of an oath, a solemn affirmation and a promise are the same: to put an
additional impact on the person's conscience and to give further motivation for the
person to tell the truth ... . There is no reason in logic to treat one class of witness as
belonging to a higher level than another class. Nor is there any reason in logic to treat
differently from the standpoints of need and importance, the three prerequisites: an oath,
a solemn affirmation and a promise.
81 Marquard, supra note 77 at 240.
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Why not forego the charade of this inquiry and accept unsworn evidence-the remaining
issue would simply be the weight accorded to the testimony. Judges almost always want to
hear the child's evidence in any event. 82
One judge in the survey addressed the difference between sworn
and unsworn testimony this way:
There is so little difference between the test for being sworn and for promising to tell the
truth that the distinction should be dropped altogether. The ability to communicate is
established, or not, in the giving of evidence itself. Why should it be a pre-condition to
attempting to testify?83
Sixty-seven per cent of victim witness workers felt that the
present inquiry is inappropriate. One commented that lawyers appear
not to understand section 16 and the distinctions within it, sometimes
mistakenly assuming that if a child cannot be sworn, she is not capable of
testifying.
C. Ability to Communicate
Section 16 of the CEA requires that children, whether giving
sworn or unsworn testimony, must be "able to communicate the
evidence."8 4 If they demonstrate an understanding of the oath, they are
invariably regarded as having the ability to communicate. In practice,
children's ability to communicate is an issue that arises only when the
court is considering whether unsworn testimony should be permitted.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Marquard considered what
aspects of testimonial competence are included in the phrase "able to
communicate the evidence."8 5 The accused argued that Parliament's
intention was to adopt all of the common law elements of testimonial
competence expressed by the words "ability to communicate the
evidence"-namely, the capability to perceive, recollect and
communicate. The Crown argued that in choosing only the word
"communicate," Parliament intended to exclude all other aspects of
testimonial competence (i.e., that the witness's ability to perceive and to
recollect the events are not part of this test).
Madame Justice McLachlin stated that the test for
communicating the evidence means more than mere verbal ability to
82 "Defence Survey," supra note 51 at question 3.
83 "Judges Survey," supra note 30.
84 Supra note 2.
85 Ibid
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communicate. It is communication specifically in reference to giving
evidence in court and must include an assessment of the child's capacity
to observe, recollect and communicate.8 6 Madame Justice McLachlin
called these qualities the "basic abilities" any individual needs to
testify,8 7 and ruled that section 16(1) was not as limited as the Crown
argued, thus incorporating some elements of the common law approach
into the legislative scheme:
The phrase "communicate the evidence" indicates more than mere verbal ability. The
reference to "the evidence" indicates the ability to testify about the matters before the
court. It is necessary to explore in a general way whether the witness is capable of
perceiving events, remembering events and communicating events to the court. If
satisfied that this is the case, the judge may then receive the child's evidence, upon the
child's promising to tell the truth under s. 16(3). It is not necessary to determine in
advance that the child perceived and recollects the very events at issue in the trial as a
condition of ruling that her evidence be received. That is not required of adult witnesses,
and should not be required for children. 88
In Marquard, the judge had initially asked the child, then about
five years of age, about the name of her teacher, what she was learning
at school, and how she got to school. Defence counsel said he was
satisfied with the questions. The Crown prosecutor then asked the child
a few questions regarding the distinction between a lie and the truth.
The transcript continued:
Q[Judge]: It would be my ruling that the unsworn evidence of this youngster be
accepted. I do not think she's capable of understanding an oath, and I would
ask you to proceed on that basis. Now, Debbie-Ann, what we're going to do
here now is Miss Creal [the Crown prosecutor] is going to ask you some
questions, and you answer them to the best of your knowledge and your
memory. Do you know what a memory is? Do you remember things that
happened?
A[Child]: No.
Q: You don't? What did you do yesterday?
A: I went down to the donut shop, and I got a drink and bubble gum.
Q: Okay. That's what I am saying is remembering, okay, so when I ask you do you
remember what you did yesterday, that was your answer. You went to the
donut shop and got a drink and some bubble gum, okay.
A: I mean gum.
86 Marquard, supra note 77 at 236.
8 7 Ibid. at 237.
88 Ib at 236-37.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Q: Plain gum, okay. Well that's good. It's important to be pretty exact. All right,
now, Miss Creal is going to ask you some questions, and I know you know the
difference between the truth and a lie, and you answer her questions as
truthfully and as best as you can remember, okay?89
This excerpt shows that a relatively modest inquiry should satisfy
the "ability to communicate" test of section 16. The child could
understand and respond to questions about past events in general, and
was therefore qualified to testify about the case without any initial
inquiry into her ability to testify about the specific events at issue. This
passage also illustrates how inappropriate it is to ask a young child
abstract questions about memory ("Do you know what memory is?" "Do
you remember things that happened?"), and how specific concrete
questions allow a child to demonstrate the ability to communicate.
As with the moral capacity component of the competency
inquiry, the legislation provides little guidance to trial judges as to the
appropriate extent of the inquiry and the type of questions that the child
should be asked about the "ability to communicate." Madame Justice
McLachlin in Marquard indicated that the standard is not high:
What is required is the basic ability to perceive, remember and communicate. This
established, deficiencies of perception, recollection and communication of the events at
issue may be dealt with as matters going to the weight of the evidence. 90
The questions asked during a competency inquiry to test
children's ability to communicate vary widely. In Marquard, we see that
at the competency inquiry, the court should ascertain that the child has
the memory and communication skills to answer questions about past
events in general, and should not focus on the specific allegations.
However, there is never any attempt to verify the accuracy of what
children say at these competency inquiries about past events, so that in
fact the sole focus of the inquiry is on the child's ability to understand
and respond to questions.
However, the "ability to communicate" means the ability to
communicate evidence in a courtroom setting. While children as young
as two years of age may be able to answer the simple investigative
questions of a police officer or social worker in an out-of-court setting,
actual courtroom testimony requires a higher level of self-confidence,
verbal comprehension, vocabulary knowledge, memory skills, and
conversational capacity.
89 R.J. Delisle, "Children as Witnesses: The Problems Persist" (1994) 25 C.R. (4th) 39 at 40.
90 Marquard, supra note 77 at 237. See also Farley, supra note 58.
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In R. v. Caron,91 the accused was on trial for allegedly sexually
abusing a five-year-old child. At the competency inquiry and during her
testimony about the alleged abuse, the child, then five and one-half years
old, was only able to provide the court with one or two word answers,
inaudible answers or no answers at all. The trial judge concluded that
the child understood the difference between the truth and a lie and
permitted her to testify on her promise to tell the truth. The Ontario
Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge had erred in allowing the child
to testify, as she lacked the ability to communicate. The court said that
the child must have "a capacity and a willingness, limited as it may be in
the case of a young child, to relate to the court the essence of what
happened to her" in the "context of an adversarial trial."92 This requires
"the capacity to relate the contentious parts of her evidence with some
independence and not entirely in response to suggestive questions." 93
Merely agreeing to "a recital of events by counsel" is not sufficient. 94
In the survey of justice system professionals, 32 per cent of the
Crown prosecutors reported that they often begin by asking children if
they remember a non-contentious event, like a birthday party or
Christmas holidays, and another 21 per cent always do. Typically,
children are asked questions like:9S
When is your birthday?
What grade are you in? Who is your teacher? What do you like about school?
Do you have friends at school? What are their names?
Can you read? What is your favorite story? What is it about?
Do you like to draw? What do you like to draw?
Who brought you here today? How did you get here?
Have you been to court before? Was I here last time?
What is Barney? Is he a dog? An elephant? What colour is Barney?
96
This portion of the inquiry, according to the defence
respondents, is best used to fully test the child's "ability to observe, their
capacity to recollect, and their capacity to communicate that
91 (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 323 (C.A.) [hereinafter Caron].
92 Ibid. at 326-27.
93 Ibid. at 326.
94 Ibid. at 326-27.
95 For examples see Leonard, supra note 26; and R. v. Patterson, [1993] O.J. No. 1767 (C.A.).
96 Barney is a purple dinosaur from a very popular children's television show.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
recollection"97 and distinguish fantasy from reality. As put by one
defence lawyer:
An examination into the child's awareness and perceptions should also be endeavoured.
How a child perceives objective realities matters more. Does the child exaggerate? Does
the child understand the given reality? What is the child really recounting when the child
describes a reality? No one can doubt the [ingenuousness] of a child, especially the very
young, and thus the inability to manufacture lies. An inquiry into the 'truth' is therefore
NOT the solution. Children lie (in the broadest sense) because they [inaccurately] believe
a reality to be true either because of distorted perceptions, suggestion or whatever .... 98
Defence counsel who responded to the survey illustrated a
number of approaches to this phase of the inquiry. Whereas some
defence lawyers want to take the opportunity to follow up on questions
that demonstrate children's ability or inability to remember details of
even non-contentious events, some stated that they viewed this as an
opportunity to "undermine the attempt to qualify," or to "either scare
the child or get friendly with the child."99
IV. CHILD WITNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A. Introduction
As in Canada, the current competency inquiry procedures in the
United States are a product of its common law tradition, with statutory
reform modifying the more stringent expectations of the common law.
Both countries use a similar approach in determining competency, with
an inquiry into whether the child is able to demonstrate an
understanding of the meaning of the truth and the importance of telling
the truth in a court, as well as an assessment of the child's ability to
communicate.
The 1895 decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Wheeler v. United States developed the U.S. common law position00 that
the competency of a child witness "depends on the capacity and
intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between the
9 7 "Defence Survey," supra note 51 at question 3.
98 Ibid. at question 9.
99 Ibid. at question 3.
100 D. Whitcombe, When the Victim is a Child, 2d ed. (Washington D.C.:, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, 1992) at 56.
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truth and falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the former."101 This test
involves assessing four fundamental elements, all of which must be
present if a child is to be competent to testify:
(1) Present understanding or intelligence to understand, on instruction, the duty
to speak the truth, which includes an understanding of the difference between
the truth and a lie or fantasy.
(2) Mental capacity at the time of the occurrence in question truly to perceive and
to register the perception.
(3) Memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the observations
made.
(4) Capacity to translate into words the memory of such observations. 102
In general, the American courts appear to have been more
flexible and realistic in their approach to the assessment of the
competency of child witnesses than the Canadian courts. American
decisions tend to focus on assessing children's actual appreciation of the
importance of telling the truth, rather than looking for answers to
abstract questions about the nature of an oath, religious beliefs and the
spiritual consequences of lying. American courts are prepared to
consider not only children's answers to questions testing their
understanding of the importance of truth telling, but also their overall
demeanor on the witness stand.103 At least some American judges have
recognized that because children may "have difficulty with abstract
questions about truth and lying" during the first few "stressful" minutes
in court does not necessarily make them incompetent to testify.104 There
are, however, cases in which American judges have refused to allow a
child to testify because of a child's inability to answer abstract questions
to about the difference between the concepts of truth and lie.105
B. Federal Rules of Evidence
Many American states and the federal Congress have modified
the common law rules to facilitate the giving of evidence by children.
101 Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 525 (1895) [hereinafter Wheeler].
102 K. Broun, et al., McCormick on Evidence, 5th ed. by J. Strong, vol. 1 (St. Paul: Westgroup
Publishing, 1999) at 271.
103 See, for example, State v. Allen, 647 So. 2d428 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
104 ibi. at 429.
105 Owens, supra note 3 at 404.
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Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,106 which govern proceedings in the
Federal Courts such as violations of federal criminal laws, children are
presumed to be competent witnesses. In practice it is relatively
uncommon for children to be called as witnesses in these proceedings,
though the Federal Rules are significant in that they serve as a model for
many state laws.107 Rules 601 and 603 are general provisions:
Rule 601: Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules.
Rule 603: Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the witness
will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated
to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty
to do so.108
Rule 601 reflects the modern trend of eliminating statutory
presumptions of incompetency based on membership in a particular
group, converting other competency issues into questions of witness
credibility to be decided by the jury.109 As a result of Rule 603, child
witnesses must either affirm or swear an oath before they may testify,
but the Federal Rules do not require any form of mandatory competency
inquiry. A competency examination may be conducted if the court
determines that "compelling reasons" exist for the inquiry, however, age
alone is not considered a compelling reason.1 10 In practice, competency
inquiries are most common with young children. Thomas Lyon and
Karen Saywitz found that, from a representative sample of 600
prosecutors of child sex abusers, about half said the testimonial
competence of child witnesses was an issue at trial in most or all of their
cases.111
In cases where the competency of a witness has become an issue,
the courts have generally not followed a literal interpretation of Rule
601, which might suggest that any child can be a witness without
106 28 U.S.C.A. (Law. Co-op. 1999) [hereinafter Federal Rules].
107 C.A. Wright & V.J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Federal Rules of Evidence (St.
Paul: Westgroup Publishing, 1990). The competency of children to testify is frequently raised in the
state courts.
108 Federal Rules, supra note 106.
109 "A Comparison and Analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence and New York Evidentiary
Law" (1996) 12 Touro L. Rev. 477; see also United States v. Cook, 949 F. 2d 289 at 293 (10th Cir.
1991).
110 18 U.S.C.A. § 3509 (West 1999) [hereinafter U.S. Code].
111 T.D. Lyon & K.J. Saywitz, "Young Maltreated Children's Competence to Take the Oath"
(1999) 3 Applied Developmental Science at 16 [hereinafter Maltreated].
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establishing competency. Rather, the courts have tended to apply the
common law standard of requiring an assessment of a child's
competence to testify.
In Galindo v. United States, the court stated that a child is
competent to testify if he or she is able to "recall the events which are
the subject of the testimony; and ... understand[s] the difference
between truth and falsehood and appreciate[s] the duty to tell the
truth."1 1 2 The trial court's decision that a three-year-old was competent
to testify was upheld by the District of Columbia Court of Appeal:
[Tihe experienced trial judge conducted an extensive voir dire and she specifically found
that while the complainant "doesn't know why she has to tell the truth ... it's quite clear
from her repeated spontaneous insistence that she doesn't tell lies, that she does tell the
truth, that she in her mind feels it was important to tell the truth and not to tell a lie.
113
However, in 1996, the same court in Owens v. United States upheld the
decision of a trial judge ruling that an eight-year-old child (called as a
witness by the defendant) was not competent to testify because during
the voir dire "the child was unable to fully recall the pertinent events. She
specifically stated that she did not understand the difference between
the truth and a lie."114
Rules 401 and 402 are also sometimes invoked to keep young
children from testifying. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." Rule 402 simply states evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible. It has been held that these Rules justify a
court excluding "patently incompetent" child witnesses from
testifying. 115
112 630 A. 2d 202 at 206-207 (D.C. App. 1993), citing Barnes v. United States, 600 A. 2d 821 at
823 (D.C. App. 1991).
113 Ibid. at 207 [emphasis added].
114 Owens, supra note 3 at 404 [emphasis added]. In this case, a prosecution for possession of
cocaine with the intent to distribute, it was the defendant who wanted to call the child as a witness.
While in theory this should make absolutely no difference to competence of the child to testify, one
might speculate that this was in fact influential.
115 J.E.B. Myers, Evidence in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 3d ed. (New York: Wiley Law
Publications, 1997) vol. 1 at 210.
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C. State Laws
Most children who testify in American courts do so in criminal
proceedings governed by state law. While the statutory provisions
dealing with the issue of child witness competency vary considerably
from state to state, many state laws are modeled on the Federal Rules.116
A number of states provide that all witnesses, regardless of age, are
competent to testify provided certain minimum statutory requirements
are met.117 These minimum requirements vary from state to state, but
usually require that the person possess the ability to communicate and
an understanding of the duty to tell the truth.118
Typically, state courts require that children must have the
"capacity of expression" and an "appreciation of the duty to tell the
truth."119 In State v. Walters,120 the Montana Court of Appeal concluded
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a
four-year-old sexual assault victim was a competent witness when the
court "methodically and carefully determined ... that [the victim] was
capable of expressing herself and that she appreciated the duty to tell
the truth."121 With regard to testimonial inconsistencies, the Supreme
Court of Montana has held that any inconsistencies within a child's
testimony is to be reflected in the determination of the child's credibility,
rather than his or her competency.1 22 Even in a case where a child
believed that the courtroom was a police station and that the judge was a
karate expert (no doubt misled by the judge's robes), the court held that
the child was a competent witness. The child's misconceptions could be
assessed by the jury in determining the weight to be attached to the
child's testimony, but did not result in the child being legally
incompetent to testify.1 23
1 1 6 See, for example, Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4061 (1999).
117 See, for example, Montana: Mont. Code Ann. tit. 26, ch.10, Rule 601 (1981).
118 In Washington, for example, the competency requirements require that a witness possess
"sound mind and discretion." See Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.020 (1999).
119 State v. Eier, 762 P. 2d 210 at 213 (Mont. 1988), citing State v. Phelps, 696 P. 2d 447 at 453
(Mont. 1985) [hereinafter Phelps].
120 806 P. 2d 497 (Mont. 1991).
12 1 Ibid. at 500.
122 State v. Newman, 790 P. 2d 971 (Mont. 1990).
123 See Phelps, supra note 119.
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In contrast to the Canadian courts, the American courts do not
seem to struggle with issues related to children's understanding of an
oath or promise. They tend to focus on a more general understanding of
the importance of telling the truth, often assessed by asking concrete
rather than abstract questions. American judges do not appear to ask
questions about religious belief or practice. This is likely due to the fact
that American statutes do not require an inquiry into children's
understanding of the "nature or consequences of an oath" or promise. It
is a common practice to ask children to promise to tell the truth, without
any concern about whether this differs from an oath. In many states
children may testify even if they cannot define an oath, or are unable to
explain the nature and purpose of an oath.124 Nor are children
necessarily required to state that the obligation to speak the truth is
greater in court than in other situations.125
In both countries, however, there is an initial assessment by the
court of children's ability to remember the events at issue and to
meaningfully answer questions. In Lowe v. State, a three-year-old
witnessed his mother's murder in a convenience store. He told a family
friend at the scene, "two peoples came in, argued with Mommy and
bang, bang, bang." 126 The accused sought to introduce the child's
statement to support his position that there were accomplices and he
was merely the get-away driver. The state sought to exclude the child's
statement on the grounds the child was incompetent at the time of the
statement. At a hearing on this motion, the child's father testified that
when the child said "peoples" it meant anybody, whether it was one or
more people. At the child's competency hearing, he said he had only
"one feet," and said counsel's tie was the colour "one." The court found
the child's testimony could not be admitted because he was "[i]ncapable
of expressing himself concerning the matter in such a manner as to be
understood." 127
In some American states, legislation has been enacted to exempt
children who are the victims of sexual abuse from the standard
124 See Strickland v. State, 297 S.E. 2d 491 (Ga. App. 1982); Lashley v. State, 208 S.E. 2d 200
(Ga. App. 1974). In some states, legislation now allows a child to testify by promising to tell the
truth. Section 710 of the California Evidence Code (1999) provides: "Every witness before testifying
shall take an oath or make an affirmation or declaration in the form provided by law, except that a
child under the age of 10, in the court's discretion, may be required only to promise to tell the
truth."
125 State v. Meyer, 113 N.W. 322 (Iowa 1907).
126 650 So. 2d 969 at 975 (Fla. 1994).
127Ibid. at 976, citing Fla. Stat. § 90.603(1) (1989).
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competency requirements, requiring them to meet a specified lower
standard or no statutorily announced standard at all.128 However, the
courts have interpreted these provisions as leaving a residual judicial
discretion to preclude children from testifying, even in the face of
legislation that provides that a child victim of an alleged sexual offence
"shall be considered a competent witness and shall be allowed to testify
without prior qualification." 129 In State v. Fulton,130 the Utah Supreme
Court held that this type of law did not mean the trial court may never
prevent such a child from testifying. It was held that under Rule 403 of
the Utah (and Federal) Rules of Evidence, the court may exclude any
testimony where the "probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice ... or misleading the jury."131 The court
further held that in considering a defendant's application to have a
child's testimony excluded, the court should consider "the child's ability
to function in the courtroom setting, i.e., to understand the questions, to
communicate ... facts to the jury, to distinguish truth from fantasy or
falsehood, etc."1 32 This type of ruling continues to allow a form of
competency inquiry for young children, albeit placing the onus on the
defendant who seeks to prevent a child from testifying.
V. CHILD WITNESSES IN ENGLAND
Originally governed by the common law, in the late nineteenth
century England enacted legislation to permit children who could not
demonstrate an understanding of an oath to testify without being sworn.
As the understanding of the capacities of child witnesses increased,
legislators reformed Britain's competency provisions and have continued
to do so in recent years. Section 33A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988
now reads:
tt(1) A child's evidence in criminal proceedings shall be given unsworm.
128 See, for example, Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-410 (1999) [hereinafter Utah Code].
Special provisions also exist at the federal level for child victims of abuse. Subsection 3509 of the
U.S. Code, supra note 110, provides that a child victim is presumed to be competent, and a
competency examination may be conducted by the court only upon written motion and offer of
proof of incompetency by a party.
129 Utah Code, ibid.
130 742 P. 2d 1208 (Utah 1987).
131 Ibi. at 1218.
132 Ibi.
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(2) A deposition of a child's unsworn evidence may be taken for the purpose of
criminal proceedings as if that evidence had been given on oath.
(2A) A child's evidence shall be received unless it appears to the court that the child
is incapable of giving intelligible testimony.
(3) In this section a 'child' means a person under fourteen years of age... 133
In D.P.P. v.M.,134 the respondent was convicted of indecently
assaulting a four-year-old girl based on the child's unsworn testimony.
The respondent appealed, arguing that by reason of her age the child
was too young to testify. The English Court of Appeal held that it was
not open to the judge to exclude the evidence of the child based on her
age alone:
The words of [the new provision] are mandatory. Care must always be taken where a
question is raised as to whether a young child is capable of giving intelligible testimony.
But where the child is so capable the court does not enjoy some wider discretion to refuse
to permit the child's evidence to be given .... A child will be capable of giving intelligible
testimony if he or she is able to understand questions and to answer them in a manner
which is coherent and comprehensible.135
In G. v. D.P.P.,136 the trial court allowed two young children
aged six and eight to give evidence-in-chief and refused to hear the
defence's expert evidence that the children were incompetent to testify.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that the trial court was right to
refuse to hear the expert evidence as the competency inquiry now "is a
simple test well within the capacity of a judge or magistrate."137
"Intelligible testimony" was held by Lord Justice Auld to be "evidence
that is capable of being understood."138 Given the simpler test under
section 33A(2A), the "courts must now listen to their evidence, for what
it is worth, and young children's understanding of the difference between
133 (U.K.), 1988, c. 33, s. 33A [hereinafter Act]. Section 33A (1), (2) and (3) were inserted into
the Criminal Justice Act 1988 by amendments in the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (U.K.), 1991, c. 53, s.
52. Section 33A(2A) was inserted into the Criminal Justice Act 1988 by the Criminal Justice and
Public OrderAct 1994 (U.K.), 1994, c. 33, Sch. 9, para. 33. Some of the Australian states have similar
legislation; see Tasmania: Evidence Act, 1910 (Tas.), s. 122C.
134 [1997] 2 All E.R. 749 [hereinafterM.].
135 Ibid. at 753, per Lord Justice Phillips.
136 [1997] 2 All E.R. 755 [hereinafter G.]
137 Ibid. at 759.
138 Ibid at 758.
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the truth and falsehood and of the need to tell the truth are now just
matters that affect its weight rather than its admissibility."139
As was done in Canada in 1988, the English reforms of 1988
abolished the requirement of corroborating evidence in order to register
a conviction based on the unsworn testimony of a child.140
VI. NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Recent psychological research raises serious questions about the
present legal requirements in Canada and the United States for
assessing the competency of child witnesses.
In their study of 192 maltreated children, Lyon and Saywitz141
found that children who had been neglected or abused often showed
developmental delays due to the treatment they suffered. These delays
make it more difficult to qualify the very group of children who are most
likely to be called as witnesses. Although these children present seriously
delayed vocabulary skills, most maltreated children by age five have a
basic understanding of the meaning and the immorality of lying.
However, the capacity of children to demonstrate their understanding is
dependent on the manner in which the children are questioned.
Lyon and Saywitz examined three ways of assessing a child's
understanding of truth and lies. Children were asked to (a) define, (b)
explain the difference between, and (c) identify in different short stories,
truth and lies.1 42 The children experienced the greatest difficulty with
the defining task as it required an abstract verbal formulation. However,
they performed much better on the identification task, in which they
could demonstrate their understanding by recognizing examples of truth
and lies. In this study, 60-70 per cent of children aged four to seven
clearly understood the difference between truth and lies in the
identification task, yet failed to show adequate understanding of the
same concepts when asked to define the terms or explain the difference
139 Act, supra note 133, s. 2A. See J.R. Spencer, "Competency: Children and Witnesses with
Learning Disabilities-Part 1" (1988) 148:6859 New Law Journal 1472; J.R. Spencer & R. Flin, The
Evidence of Children: The Law and Psychology, 2d ed. (London: Blackstone Press, 1993) at 51-52.
140 SeeAct, supra note 133, s. 34.
141 Maltreated, supra note 111.
142 Ibid. at 17. See also S.J. Ceci, M. DeSimone Leichtman & M. Putnick eds., Cognitive and
Social Factors in Early Deception (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum, 1992); S.J. Ceci & M. Bruck,Jeopardy
in the Courtroom: A Scientific Analysis of Children's Testimony (Washington, D.C.: APA, 1995);
D.A. Poole & M.E. Lamb, Investigative Interviews of Children: A Guide for Helping Professionals
(Washington, D.C.: APA, 1998).
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between them. The youngest participants (aged four) in their study were
no better than chance at identifying statements that were false (i.e., lies),
but were very good at identifying the truth.
Lyon and Saywitz suggest that there was a motivational barrier
arising from the way in which the questions were posed that made
children reluctant to demonstrate an understanding of lying. In this
study (as is often the case in court), the questions were phrased in a way
that required children to identify the questioner as the one who has told
a lie. As children may be reluctant to identify an authority figure as a liar
or morally bad person, these motivational difficulties can be minimized
by phrasing recognition questions so that children identify another child
in a story as telling a lie instead.
The authors of this article have also recently completed
laboratory research at Queen's University that more directly assesses
whether the present legal test for the assessment of the competence of
children has any validity for determining whether children are in fact
telling the truth.143 Empirical research suggests that there is no
relationship between a child's performance on the cognitive assessment
of their understanding of such concepts as truth and lies, and their actual
behaviour. In the first study, 130 children aged four to seven committed
a transgression by peeking at a toy while alone in a room, contrary to
their instructions. Of these children, 74 per cent lied when asked about
their transgression. The children were more likely to lie if they were
older.144 Before being asked about their transgression, they were asked
questions about truth and lying. Even though 87 per cent could identify a
lie in a story and 73 per cent said lying was bad, there was no statistically
significant relationship between whether they actually lied and whether
they could identify a lie and say it was bad. In fact, 72 per cent of the
liars said it was bad to lie. This suggests that truth-telling behaviour is
not related to knowing the "correct" answers to questions about truth
143 The first two studies were conducted by V. Talwar & K. Lee; see V. Talwar & K. Lee, The
Relation Between Children's Moral Understanding of Lying and Their Truth Telling Behaviour
(American Psychology-Law Society, New Orleans, March 2000).
144 There were a total of 158 children in the first study. The children were left in a room and
asked not to peek at a hidden toy while the experimenter left. However, to create a strong
temptation to peek, they were told that they would get a prize if they could guess what the toy was
when the experimenter returned. The children were observed through a one way mirror while alone
in the room. Out of the 158 children, 130 (82 per cent) peeked. When the experimenter returned,
she asked the children who peeked if they peeked at the toy. Out of the 130 who peeked, 74 per cent
lied by denying that they had peeked. In the lying group there was no statistically significant
difference in whether the children actually lied based on whether child could identify a lie or say
that lying is bad; 72 per cent of liars said that it is bad to lie while 81 per cent of confessors did so, a
difference that is not statistically significant.
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and lies, nor is truth-telling behaviour related to knowing that lying is
"bad."
In the second study eighty six children aged three to seven lied
about peeking at a toy, contrary to their instructions. Before being asked
about their transgression, the children were questioned about truth and
lying, and then asked to promise to tell the truth about their
transgression (peeking).145 The rate of lying dropped from 74 per cent
(in the first study) to 57 per cent in the study in which children were
asked to promise to tell the truth-a statistically significant drop.
Interestingly, the effect of promising to tell the truth had the greatest
effect of increasing truth-telling behaviour with younger children (aged
four to five) who had the greatest difficulty in answering questions about
truth and lying.
In order to examine the specific relation between promising and
children's lie-telling behaviour, a third study was conducted. In this study
there were 102 children between ages four and seven who peeked at the
toy. Children were randomly divided into two conditions, or groups,
where they were asked about their transgression. They were either asked
to promise to tell the truth, or were questioned about truth and lying but
not asked to promise to tell the truth.1 46 A significant difference in the
rate of lying was found between the two conditions. While 80 per cent of
children lied in the condition where they were questioned about lies and
truth, only 60 per cent lied when asked to promise to tell the truth. Thus,
it seems that the cognitive assessment of their understanding of lies and
truth bears little relation to their behaviour, while promising to tell the
truth does decrease the rate of lie-telling but does not eliminate it. The
results taken together suggest that the only component of the present
145 One hundred and three children, aged three to seven years, participated in Study Two. Of
these children eighty six (83 per cent), contrary to instructions, peeked at the toy while tile
experimenter was out of the room. They were then asked about lying, and asked to promise to tell
the truth about their transgression. A weak inverse correlation was found between age and the
effect of making a promise. That is, promising to tell the truth increases the likelihood that children
will tell the truth, especially at younger ages (four and five years).
146 One hundred and thirty children participated in Study Three. The children were divided
randomly into two conditions. In the first condition, children were asked to promise to tell the truth
before being questioned about their transgression. There were fifty two children in this condition
who peeked. In the second condition, children were asked questions about the concepts of truth and
lies before being questioned about their transgression. In this condition there were fifty children
who peeked. A statistically significant difference was found in children's lie-telling behaviour
between the two conditions: in the first condition only 60 per cent of children lied, while in the
second 80 per cent of children lied. Thus, it appears that promising to tell the truth decreased lie-
telling behaviour, while asking questions about truth and lies has no impact on the rate of children's
lie-telling behaviour.
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assessment process that is useful is asking the child to promise to tell the
truth.
The present competence examination is based on the assumption
that if children demonstrate an understanding of what a lie is and the
negative moral implications of lying, they should be more likely to tell
the truth in the court. The authors' studies fail to confirm this
assumption. To the contrary, their research suggests there is no
relationship between a child's performance on the cognitive assessment
of their understanding of such concepts as truth and lies, and their actual
lie-or truth-telling behaviour. Furthermore, this research is consistent
with a larger body of psychological theory and research about child
development and truth-telling behaviour.147
A person's decision to lie in a situation is a function of an often
complex interaction of the person's psychological motivations and the
context of the situation. These psychological motivations are not linked
to the cognitive development needed to "correctly" answer the types of
questions asked at a competency inquiry. On the other hand, research
suggests that very young children (aged two to three) lack the cognitive
development to lie (deliberately tell a falsehood with the intent of
deceiving the listener), and young children (aged three to five) generally
lack the cognitive development and self awareness effectively to deceive.
In other words, most young children's lies can be easily detected because
they are unskilled at maintaining consistencies between their lies and
other statements they make in the same context, or their lies lack logical
consistency.
It is desirable to replicate and extend this type of laboratory
research.148 The results of these studies, however, are consistent with
147 See, for example, K. Lee, "Lying as Doing Deceptive Things with Words: A Speech Act
Theoretical Perspective" in J. W. Astington (ed.), Minds in the Making: Essays in Honour of David R.
OLron (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).
148 The authors are engaging in further laboratory research about children, truth-telling and
lying. This research includes more closely simulating court situations of the competency inquiry;
creating situations where parents have children lie, rather than having children lie about their own
transgressions; and assessing the effect of different types of inquiries on the ability of mock jurors to
accurately decide whether a child is telling the truth.
In June 1999, Thomas Lyon and Joyce Dorado presented research findings to the American
Psychological Association in Denver, Co. [unpublished]. Lyon and Dorado reported on two studies
that also support the conclusion that honesty in young children is not related to the ability to "pass"
the competence inquiry, but that making a child promise to tell the truth does increase honesty. In
Study One, 109 maltreated children aged six and seven were asked about a transgression (looking
for hidden toys while the experimenter left the room) and asked competency questions. One-third
were asked to promise to tell the truth and one-third were given reassurance that transgression is
common and that there would be no sanction for telling the truth. No relationship was found
between how children performed on the competency test and their honesty. However, 83 per cent in
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child development theory and strongly suggest that the present
competency inquiries used in criminal proceedings in Canada and the
United States do not serve the function of helping to exclude from
testifying children who are less likely to tell the truth. There appears to
be no relationship between whether a child can answer cognitive
questions about truth and lying, and whether a child actually tells the
truth. Expecting children to correctly answer questions about truth and
lying may result in some children being precluded from testifying who
may be accurate and truthful witnesses. While there appears to be some
value (and likely no harm) in asking children to promise to tell the truth,
there is no value in asking them to articulate why this is significant, or in
expecting them to answer questions about what it means to promise.
VII. THE NEED FOR REFORM
Over the past twenty years, the Canadian legal system has
developed a more flexible approach to child witnesses. A realistic
appreciation of the capacities of children, coupled with a commitment to
the further protection of children from criminal victimization and
subsequent victimization in the court system, lead to amendments of the
CEA in 1988.149 These amendments rejected the historical perception of
children as inherently unreliable witnesses, while recognizing that they
are not adults and are entitled to treatment that accords with their needs
and abilities. It is now recognized that children can provide reliable
evidence.
In the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in F.(W.),
Madame Justice McLachlin recognized that judicial questioning at the
competence inquiry has often been inappropriate:
The law once refused to take cognizance of the special problems young witnesses face
and the corresponding difficulties those who seek to prosecute crimes against young
children consequently encounter. Child witnesses were treated like adults-indeed even
more severely. Not only did they have to take the oath, but also, unlike adults, they were
subjected to grilling on whether they understood its religious implications. If they failed
this hurdle or the others that might appear down the road, like corroboration, their
the reassured group told the truth, whereas only 31 per cent of those in the promise group and 47
per cent of the control group told the truth. One hundred and nine maltreated children aged six and
seven (excluding children who did not "pass" the competence test) participated in Study Twp. A
confederate played with the child and toy while the experimenter was gone, and then told the child
that they might get into trouble if anyone found out. About 50 per cent of children in the control
group told the experimenter the truth, whereas over 80 per cent of children in promise and
reassurance conditions told the truth.
1 4 9 Supra, note 2.
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evidence was completely lost. The law, in recent decades, has come to realize that this
approach was wrong. 150
While this type of judicial pronouncement from the Supreme
Court of Canada should have some effect on how judges conduct
competency inquiries, there is clearly a need for further legislative
reform. Despite the 1988 amendments, section 16 of the CEA continues
to render the competency inquiry artificial and overly complex.
The 1999 consultation paper of the Department of Justice
Canada on Child Victims and The Criminal Justice System, suggested that:
The competency test, and its interpretation by the courts, appears to add unnecessary
complexity. The unintended effects of [the 1988] reform may have made the experience
of child witnesses more rather than less traumatic and made it more difficult for their
evidence to be heard. Preliminary proceedings for child witnesses are becoming more
common and complex. A stigma continues to attach to evidence that is unsworn or given
on a promise to tell the truth.
15 1
One problem with the present legislation is its emphasis on
assessing the child's responses to questions about of the "nature of an
oath." This is often interpreted as requiring a child to answer questions
that would confound religious scholars.15 2 By delving into a child's
religious understanding and beliefs, the inquiry has lost its true focus,
which is not to determine whether a child is religiously trained, but
whether the child is committed to telling the truth as a witness. This
problem was considered by the Criminal Law Revision Committee in
England:
The inquiry whether the child understands the nature of the oath, if carried out
conscientiously, seems to us unrealistic; and the investigation sometimes made by the
court as to whether the child believes in divine retribution for lying is really out of place
when the question is whether he understands how important it is for the proceedings that
he should tell the truth to the best of his ability about the events in question, in particular
150 Supra note 36 at 591.
151 Department of Justice, Canada Child Victims and the Criminal Justice System: A
Consultation Paper (Ottawa: November 1999) at 17, online: Department of Justice, <http:ll
www.canada.justice.gc.ca/consultations/enfants/consullen.html#intro> (date accessed: 28
February 2001).
152 There is a broader argument that in an increasing secular society, the requirement for
tesimony under oath should be abolished for all witnesses; see for example, T. Matlow, "Let's Swear
Off the Oath in Court" The Globe and Mail (14 March 2000) A15, where a judge of the Ontario
Superior Court advocates abolition of the oath and replacement by a promise, with an admonition
of the possibility of a prosecution for perjury if the witness lies.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
that he should not say anything against the accused which he does not really believe to be
true and that he should say if he did not see something or does not remember it.153
The work of the English Commission resulted in the 1988 reforms in
that country.
A second problem with the current inquiry is the distinction
between sworn and unsworn testimony, and the effect that this has on
the complexity of the inquiry. With the elimination of the corroboration
requirement for unsworn evidence, a number of appellate decisions have
held that the weight to be attached to the evidence of a child witness
should not be affected by the "form of the witness's commitment to tell
the truth"--i.e., whether or not the child gives sworn or unsworn
testimony.154 While it is clear that some judges still place greater weight
on sworn testimony, there is no justification for giving greater weight to
a child's testimony merely because the child has demonstrated an
understanding of the oath. If the weight accorded the evidence of a child
witness is not affected by whether the witness is sworn, there is no value
in engaging in the complex inquiry into whether a child understands the
oath.155
The core problem with the current competency inquiry is that
the questions asked are essentially irrelevant to the issue of whether the
child is actually committed to telling the truth. The psychological
153 As cited in M. Howard, Phipson on Evidence, 14th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1990)
at 147. A similar position was taken in Canada in 1984 by the Report of the Committee on Sexual
Offences Against Children and Youth [the Badgley Committee Report] (Ottawa: Supply and Services
Canada, 1984).
Several provinces and territories in Canada have enacted legislation to eliminate or
simplify the competency requirement for children to testify in civil proceedings, though it is rare for
children to testify in these proceedings, and there is no reported case law interpreting these
provisions. See, for example, Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E-23, s. 18.1, (as amended S.O.
1995, c. 6., s. 6). These amendments were a response to the Ontario Law Reform Commission,
Report on Child Witnesses (Toronto: OLRC, 1991).
154 McGovern, supra note 60 at 307.
155 Another issue in the competency inquiry is the apparent lack of opportunity afforded
children to testify under affirmation. An affirmation is a solemn pledge to tell the truth. Unlike the
oath, there are no religious connotations to the affirmation. However, a person of the age of
criminal responsibility (twelve years or older in Canada) knowingly making a false statement under
affirmation (or oath) can be convicted of perjury. Despite the courts' preoccupation with the moral
connotations of the oath, child witnesses do not appear to be afforded the opportunity to affirm. In
questioning a child witness, when the questioner believes that a child lacks a religious understanding
of the nature of an oath, the questioner immediately refocuses the inquiry onto the child's ability to
understand the nature of a promise to tell the truth, never exploring a child's understanding of a
solemn affirmation. Children with insufficient or no religious education or understanding may be
incorrectly presumed by the court to be incapable of understanding the obligations of "sworn"
testimony, and should be permitted to affirm.
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research discussed in this paper indicates that a child's commitment to
telling the truth is unrelated to whether the child has the cognitive ability
to answer questions about truth-telling or lying.
The concerns about the competency inquiry are an important
illustration of the broader problem of asking children developmentally
inappropriate questions.15 6 There is a need for better training for judges
and lawyers in questioning young children in general, not just for
competency inquiries. Many of the questions typically asked of children
in competency inquiries are developmentally inappropriate. As Walker
points out:
studies showed conclusively that asking for a definition ("What is truth/a lie?") or
explanation of the difference (the harder of the two tasks) failed to demonstrate the real
competence of young children. Asking children to identify statements as true or false
through use of hypothetical questions ("If I tell you x ...), however, allowed almost all of
the 5-year-olds to demonstrate credibly their understanding of truth and lies ... to
establish that children have an appreciation for telling only what really happened ....
[This] can best be accomplished by first asking young children age-appropriate
hypothetical questions which put the truth or lie in someone else's mouth.
157
Until the competency inquiry is legislatively reformed, those who
are questioning children in this process need education and training to
ask developmentally appropriate questions.158 For young children,
questions should not focus on abstract definitions. Young children
should be asked to identify lies. Preferably children should be asked
questions about hypothetical stories159 in which a person is (or is not)
156 Our survey data reveals that children are routinely asked confusing questions,
inappropriate for their age and level of understanding. Questions lie buried in legal jargon, double
negatives and adult vocabulary. Sixty-seven per cent of victim witness workers said children are
almost always asked questions that are too complex in terms of both structure and content. At age
four or five, children's vocabulary does not often include such words as: fellatio, cunnilingus,
pedestrian, ascertain or affirmation. "Legalese" is just as confusing. Examples of parts of questions
that are developmentally inappropriate for young children include: "I suggest to you," "Did you
have occasion to" or "How sure are you - 90%, 80%?"
157 A. G. Walker, Handbook on Questioning Children: A Linguistic Perspective, 2nd ed.
(Washington: ABA Center on Children and the Law, 1999) at 58-59 [hereinafter Handbook].
158 M. Mian et al., "The Child as Witness" (1990) 4 C.R. (4th) 359.
159 Children may be reluctant to correctly answer a question in which a judge or other
authority figure like a lawyer poses a question in which the speaker is telling a lie (or erroneous
statement). Asking a child to identify another person in a story as telling a lie is preferable. See
Maltreated, supra note 111; see also T.D. Lyon et al., "Reducing Motivational Barriers to
Oath-Taking Competence," USC Working Paper Series, online: USC, <http:llpapers.ssrn.coml
paper.tafabstract, id=209609> (date accessed: February 28, 2001); and T. Lyon & K. Saywitz,
"Qualifying Children to Take the Oath: Materials for Interviewing Professions" (revised, May,
2000) online: USC, <http:/lwww.hal-law.usc.edu.users/tlyon/comp/title.htm> (last modified: May,
2000).
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telling a lie, and the child is asked to identify whether another person is
telling a lie, and whether this is good or bad.160
Parliament should abolish the competency inquiry for child
witnesses and make clear that they are competent witnesses who are to
testify without being sworn.161 The experience with the 1988 reforms in
Canada (and similar reforms in the United States) demonstrates 'that
new legislation about child witnesses tends to be narrowly interpreted,
with older notions of competency inquiries influencing how the new laws
are applied. Thus, the explicit English legislation should serve as a model
for reform, with provision that all children under fourteen should give
evidence without being sworn, and that their evidence should be treated
as if given under oath. Further, there should be explicit provision that a
child's "evidence shall be received unless it appears to the court that the
child is incapable of giving intelligible testimony."162
Legislation (or judicial practice) should provide for an initial
period of questioning and instruction by the judge (or the lawyer who
has called a child as a witness) in order to prepare the child for testifying
about the events in dispute, but it should be clear that this is not to serve
as a legal requirement to establish competency to testify. Questions at
this stage should focus on events unrelated to the proceeding, allowing
the child an opportunity to become comfortable with the court setting.
During this questioning, the judge should assess the child's ability to
understand and answer questions, for example, relating to numbers,
measurement and time. If, at this stage, the child demonstrates an
inability to answer certain types of questions, such as those related to
time, this should affect the types of questions that a judge allows counsel
to ask the child.
During this initial phase of questioning, children should also be
encouraged and instructed about the need to give responses that are as
detailed as possible.163 It would be a useful practice for judges to provide
a child witness with simple instructions about the importance of telling
the truth in court. The child should be assured that even if they may have
said some different things in the past, this is the place to tell what really
160 See, for example, Handbook, supra note 157 at Appendix D; and "Appropriate Questions,"
supra note 74.
161 While the main focus of the discussion in this paper has been on the legislative regime in
Canada, other jurisdictions that have not reformed their child competency legislation would also
benefit from this type of law reform.
162 Act, supra note 133, s. 33A(2A)
163 "Appropriate Questions," supra note 74 at 280-84.
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happened.1 64 Children should also be instructed that if there are
questions which they do not understand that they should indicate this,
and if there are questions that they cannot answer, they should so
indicate rather than guess.
Child witnesses should be asked to promise to tell the truth, but
it should not be necessary for children to demonstrate an understanding
of the meaning of the term "promise." Most children as young as three
years of age have a basic understanding of the concept of promising, but
that does not mean they can answer questions from a judge or lawyer
that clearly demonstrate this understanding. Further, legislation should
specify that the failure of a child to make such a promise should not
affect the child's opportunity to testify.
If it becomes clear during this initial period of questioning that a
child lacks the cognitive capacity, communication skills, or social
development to meaningfully answer simple questions in a court room
setting, the child should be excused from testifying. Similarly, it may
become apparent at this initial stage that the child is too frightened or
upset to testify, and needs to testify by closed circuit television or should
be altogether excused from testifying. Even if a young child has sufficient
communication skills to provide the cburts with evidence, the child
should not testify if it appears that the child would be traumatized by the
experience of testifying. The welfare of the child should not be sacrificed
for the sake of the criminal process. The fact that the experience of
testifying is likely to traumatize a child is already considered a
justification for excusing a child from testifying and finding it necessary
to admit reliable hearsay evidence.
164 Children, like adults, will have made prior statements to the police and others. There may
be a "commitment effect" for any witness; the witness feels obliged to repeat the story they told
earlier, even if they believe that it is not true. While the "commitment effect" can never be
completely overcome, children can be reassured that the emphasis is on telling the truth, not
repeating what they may have said earlier. We are grateful to Prof. Manson of Queen's University
for making this point.

